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INSURANCE 
How Insurance 
Substitutes for 
Regulation 
Through private contracting, insurers monitor 
safety in ways that government can't. 
BY OMRI BEN-SHAHAR AND KYLE D. LOGUE 
L
egal regulation of behavior requires information. 
Acquiring information about the regulated party's con­
duct, setting benchmarks by which that conduct is mea­
sured, and establishing the correct scale of payoffs for 
violating or following regulation are costly and require expertise 
and motivation. Thus, economic theories of rulemaking are 
often based on the relative information advantages that differ­
ent regulatory bodies have and how that information can be 
harnessed to enhance incentives and thereby improve welfare. 
Government regulators, on average, do not have informational 
advantages. They are not paid for performance and thus may lack 
adequate incentives. They are not disciplined by market forces and 
are only imperfectly disciplined by career concerns or by the political 
process. Moreover, they commonly lack the most advanced tools for 
information acquisition, aggregation, and prediction. Courts, for 
example, do not search for information independently, but instead 
receive only what parries present to them through the litigation pro­
cess, which is costly, ad hoc, and as a result often bypassed by crude 
settlements. Courts are also ill-equipped to recognize the distribu­
tion of characreristics from which any given case is sampled 
Government agencies, too, have limited resources to monitor 
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or anticipate patterns in the behavior of sophisticated industries, 
often inspecting only a small sample of the regulated conduct. 
They may be plagued by internal principal-agent problems and 
they are often outpaced and outsmarted by the regulated parties. 
Can anyone regulate risky behavior better than the government? 
Private insurance companies can, and already do, replace or 
augment the standard-setting and safety-monitoring currently 
performed by government. And they do so in ways that may 
increase overall social welfare. 
To those readers trained in economics, this claim would seem 
counterintuitive. In much of the economic literature, insurance 
is seen as antithetical to risk reduction. Indeed, one of the corner­
stones of the economics of information is the moral hazard prob­
lem: the idea that a party who is insured against risk has subopti­
mal incentive to reduce it. As Joseph Stiglitz explained in his 1983 
paper "Risk, Incentives, and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral 
Hazard," "the more and better insurance that is provided against 
some contingency, the less incentive individuals have to avoid the 
insured event, because the less they bear the consequences of their 
actions." Judge Frank Easterbrook concurred: "Insurance creates 
moral hazard: when someone else pays the tab, the insured will take 
additional risks and may incur costs deliberately" (Burden-Meeks v. 
Welch, 319 F.3d 897 (2003)). 
We argue that insurance can reduce and in some cases solve, 
rather than create or exacerbate, moral hazard and related incen­
tive problems. When people create risk to others (or themselves), 
insurance is the mechanism that converts the concern about the 
loss or the vague threat of liability into a concrete set of harm-
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reducing measures. It supplies both the incentive and the know­
how that individuals and firms often lack, resulting in a more 
efficient level of accidents. 
We contend that private insurance markets can and some­
times do outperform the government in regulating conduct 
because of both superior information and competition. Insurers 
who can offer more coverage at lower premiums will attract cus­
tomers, even when they require their customers to modify their 
conduct in a costly way. As long as the standards imposed by the 
insurers are efficient, customers should be lured by the discounts. 
Moreover, insurers' concern with affordability-increasing the 
pool of its clientele-is another force pushing for increased con­
duct regulation. Safe behavior by insureds reduces the cost of 
premiums and increases the size of the insurers' market. 
How Insurers Regulate Safety 
Information is critical to the business of insurance. Insurers use 
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information in performing their risk-spreading and risk-shifting 
functions. Information is necessary in pricing policies, assem­
bling insurance pools, and verifying claims. Actuarialism-the 
basic methodology in insurance-is the skill of computing pre­
miums according to information about probabilities and harms. 
Insurers also use information in a subtler and less familiar 
way: to induce efficient risk-reducing behavior. The same data 
that go into the risk-spreading and risk-shifting computations 
are relevant and informative in determining how to reduce risk. 
Insurers, therefore, perform the additional information-heavy 
function of identifying and administering a system of safety 
improvements. We view this 
function as a form of priva- ································ 
stiff sanctions on insureds that misrepresent information. 
Second, insurers cooperate to pool and analyze risk-related 
information through various industry-owned insurance rating 
bureaus. These shared data and services, which are especially 
valuable to the smaller insurance companies that do not have 
large quantities of their own data, make insurance markets more 
stable and competitive. 
Third, while insurers often use averages in underwriting and 
pricing policies (that is, estimates based on average accident costs 
for parties that are similar to the insured), they are also able to 
tailor and adjust their premiums according to each policyholder's 
tized safety regulation. 
Why do insurers want to 
reduce the risk their policy­
holders face? Insurance pur­
chasers naturally gravitate to 
insurance policies that offer the 
Insurers not only have the incentive, the demand, and 
the competitive pressure to collect and administer 
information about risk, they also have the tools to do so. 
most desirable combination of 
price and product (both quality 
and quantity). Therefore, insur-
ers that can identify cheap risk-reduction measures can mandate 
them and attract more business by offering lower premiums that 
more than offset the cost of the mandated measures. 
Another reason why insurers regulate the risk-reduction 
behavior of their customers is that the insurers are the ones 
primarily benefiting from any risk reduction that occurs after 
the policy is issued. Once the insured has paid the premium, any 
covered loss that is suffered is borne by the insurer; therefore, any 
loss prevented or reduced by care-level investments made by the 
insured is a net benefit to the insurer. 
Insurers not only have the incentive, the demand, and the 
competitive pressure to collect and administer information 
about risk, they also have the tools to do so. Below, we describe 
the types of tools used by insurers to manage risk and incentivize 
risk reduction. 
Ex Ante Regulation 
Insurers' most basic tool for creating incentives to reduce risk 
is the setting of differentiated premiums. Insurers charge lower 
premiums to careful policyholders, those that can prove they 
take effective measures to reduce the insured risks. To deter­
mine an insured's idiosyncratic level of care, insurers have to 
collect information, which they do in various ways. 
First, during the underwriting process, insurers often require 
their insureds to fill out lengthy insurance applications that 
provide the insurer with detailed information about their idio­
syncratic risk characteristics. The credibility of the information 
acquired during the underwriting is bolstered by the use of veri­
fication methods, such as health screening tests for life insurance 
applicants or site surveys for environmental liability insurance. 
The credibility of the underwriting process is also protected by 
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risk characteristics and ongoing behavior, as well as its loss experi­
ence over time. Through these insured-specific premium adjust­
ments over time, the insured is made aware of precisely what 
safety investments-both care-level and activity-level-correlate 
with particular reductions in expected accident costs. 
Differentiated insurance premiums provide explicit prices to 
people's choices of care in much the same way as government-set 
Pigouvian taxes. Thus, in contrast to traditional command-and­
control rulemaking, where the agency is faced with a binary 
choice between whether to require a particular safety measure or 
not (which in turn requires the regulator to compare the benefit 
of that safety measure with its cost), insurers need only to price 
the expected risk reduction associated with the safety investment. 
The insureds themselves then make the choice whether that 
safety investment-given its costs and benefits-makes sense in 
their particular circumstances. Insureds for whom the cost of the 
safety measure is low relative to its benefits will ''buy" it; others 
will not. This sorting avoids the inefficiency of mandated, across­
the-board safety requirements. 
Coaching safer conduct I A standard assumption in the insur­
ance literature on moral hazard is that insurers have less infor­
mation about policyholders' idiosyncratic care levels and risk 
types than the policyholders themselves have. This assumption 
is often contradicted by another widely held assumption about 
the insurance industry, that insurers have expertise in acquiring 
and sorting complex information. While it is true that insureds 
have some information that insurers cannot observe, insurers 
are likely to have significant advantages in understanding and 
calculating how different types of care and safety affect risk. 
While policyholders know which precautions they have taken, 
they often lack the expertise to quantify the effect of the pre-
caution on risk reduction, and to ascertain whether the cost of 
the precaution is justified. Is it worthwhile to refit one's home 
with fire extinguishing sprinklers? To install a car antitheft 
device? To take a particular medical screening test? Even com­
mercial parties buying liability insurance may not realize how 
their expected cost would be reduced by taking simple precau­
tions-until their insurer prices it. 
Building on this information advantage, insurers perform a 
regulatory function that public regulators rarely do: they "edu­
cate" their insureds on how to avoid and reduce risks. Product 
liability insurers, for example, offer "product protection" plans 
that review the safety of product designs, the quality controls in 
manufacturing, and the warnings attached to the product. Simi­
larly, workers' compensation insurers coach employers on how to 
refit and organize the workplace and how to train their employ­
ees, all with an eye to avoiding costly accidents. Environmental 
liability insurers make on-site visits and instruct policyholders on 
how to avoid costly damages and how to comply with (or exceed) 
environmental regulatory standards. Pollution insurance under­
writers send engineers to the sites to examine how landfills are 
engineered and built and how waste is disposed, and to provide 
instruction where needed. 
Implementing private safety codes I Insurers are instrumen­
tal in disseminating efficient safety technology. Safety measures 
that create positive externalities-benefits to other policyhold­
ers-would be underutilized in the absence of insurance. How­
ever, because insurance aggregates the interests of disperse 
policyholders, it helps to internalize such cross-insured ben­
efits. For example, car owners can fit their cars with devices like 
Lojack, an antitheft transmitter that dramatically increases 
the chance of recovering a stolen car. Lojack creates a deterrent 
effect that actually benefits others and, owing to transaction 
costs, the Lojack purchaser cannot capture the value of this 
benefit through a market transaction. Thus, car owners pur­
chase Lojack less often than is socially desirable. Insurance 
contracts offer a solution to this incentive problem. That is, 
insurers serve to collectivize the otherwise externalized benefit 
of the Lojack investment. Unsurprisingly, then, insurers pro­
vide substantial premium discounts-often 20 percent-to auto 
owners who install Lojack. 
Research and development of safety methods I Insurers
cooperate in identifying safety technologies and disseminating 
new risk reduction methods. For example, the auto insurance 
industry has for many years funded research designed to iden­
tify ways to reduce the losses associated with automobile acci­
dents. The industry operates an institute that tests and rates 
the crashworthiness of automobiles, and it organizes concerted 
efforts to lobby for mandatory safety devices (such as airbags). 
Likewise, many of the standards relating to fire prevention and 
building fire codes were developed by the insurance industry 
and were subsequently accepted by builders, firefighters, courts, 
and lawmakers as the state of the art. The homeowners' insur-
ance industry has its own association researching and promul­
gating standards of safety with respect to property risks. 
Ex Post Regulation 
In addition to regulation prior to the loss, insurers also sub­
stitute for ex post regulation-the attachment of legal conse­
quences to behavior after it has occurred. The most common 
form of ex post legal regulation is a court-imposed sanction. 
A great body of literature explores the informational and 
administrative properties of ex post regulation. In this section, we 
are interested in identifying the informational tools that insurers 
have that government decisionmakers do not. 
Claims management I Every insurer operates some type of 
claims-management system, a network of adjusters who are 
employed to investigate claimed losses, measure them, and 
negotiate payouts. Claims adjusters implement in a routine, 
uniform way the investigation and fact-finding procedures 
that are designed centrally. They apply simple rules for deter­
mination of fault and causation, for quantifying losses, and for 
settling disputes. This process reduces delays in payments to 
claimants and transforms vague safety standards issued by law 
into clear bright-line rules issued by insurers. 
Mitigation of loss I Another way in which insurers regulate
losses ex post is by helping to mitigate covered losses. This 
can be seen clearly in contractual provisions, found in most 
insurance policies, that require insureds to take all reasonable 
post-accident steps to mitigate losses or else forfeit coverage. 
Insurers also help insureds mitigate losses by monitoring repair 
services. The most ubiquitous example of this occurs in the 
automobile insurance context. Auto insurers often exercise 
strict control over the choice of companies to do the repairs. 
Environmental insurers also maintain control over the choice 
of contractors that insureds can hire to do the remediation or 
clean-up costs covered under environmental liability policies. 
By getting directly involved in this way, insurers both reduce the 
magnitude and gain an accurate estimate of the insured loss. 
In addition, liability insurers help to control overall litigation 
costs ex post through their role as the financer of their insureds' 
legal defense. Liability insurance policies generally assign to insur­
ers the contractual obligation and responsibility to provide a legal 
defense for their insureds. As a result, liability insurers have expe­
rience and expertise in selecting defense counsel and managing 
litigation expenditures, resulting in lower overall costs. Although 
this arrangement, where the insurer is both on the hook for loss 
claims (within the policy limits) and in charge of the litigation, 
can pose some conflicts of interests, it nevertheless leads to rea­
sonably low-cost resolution of legal disputes for the vast majority 
of liability insureds. More fundamentally, the role of insurers in 
litigation and settlement often overrides the effect of substantive 
compensation doctrines. For example, insurance policy limits, 
not legal remedies, are found to dictate the settlement amount. 
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Ex post underwriting I Another type of ex post regulation by 
insurers, which has come under criticism from some commen­
tators, consists of refusal to pay out claims based on policies 
that were issued after the insured materially misrepresented 
some information at the underwriting phase. The efficient 
functioning of insurance markets depends on insurers' ability 
to gather accurate information about insurance applicants. 
To achieve this end, insurers have two general strategies: They 
can spend resources at the underwriting stage to investigate and 
verify the information given by insureds on their applications; 
and some of this they do. But exhaustive ex ante information veri­
fication can be very costly. A cheaper alternative is for the insur­
ers to accept as true the answers given by the insureds on their 
applications when submitted (unless there is a red flag on the 
application that suggests further investigation is warranted), but 
then to examine more closely 
only the applications of the ································ 
that would complement it as a regulator of risk. For example, 
under a tort regime of no liability for product-caused harms (for 
example, the old regime under which courts enforced product­
warranty disclaimers for personal injuries caused by product 
accidents), the primary government regulator of product safety 
will be command-and-control government agencies and the 
primary insurer-regulator will be first-party health insurers. By 
contrast, under a tort regime of strict products liability, the pri­
mary government regulator will be the courts and the primary 
insurer-regulator will be liability insurance companies. Thus the 
choice between no liability and strict liability turns largely on the 
question of which type of insurance-first-party health, disability, 
and life insurance or third-party liability insurance-is better at 
reducing product-related accidents. 
The choice seems pretty clear. First-party insurers are poorly 
small subset of insureds that 
end up submitting a loss claim. 
Under this approach, only a 
fraction of the applications 
need to be thoroughly investi­
gated. If a material falsehood 
is then found, and if it can be 
shown that the insurer relied 
Thus the choice between no liability and strict liability 
turns largely on the question of which type of 
insurance-first-party health, disability, and life 
insurance or third-party liability insurance-is better at 
reducing product-related accidents. 
upon that falsehood in issuing 
or pricing the policy, the insurer can then rescind the policy and 
deny the insured's claim. The effect of this ex post denial of the 
claim is to improve the ex ante incentives of insureds to provide 
truthful information at the underwriting stage, and to do so at 
considerably lower cost than would be the case with exhaustive ex 
ante investigations by the insurer of every single insured. 
While there is a risk of insurer opportunism (for example, 
insurers asking intentionally vague questions on the applica­
tions to create the opportunity for a misrepresentation defense 
ex post) and innocent mistakes by consumers can occur during 
the application process, those concerns can be addressed through 
common law doctrines, and bad faith sanctions can be imposed 
on the worst-offending insurers when appropriate. 
Examples oflnsurers as Safety Regulators 
Agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC), the Food and Drug Administration, and the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) regulate the 
safety of products and product use. In addition to such ex ante 
agency-based government regulation, product safety is also 
regulated ex post through the application of tort law by courts. 
Choosing the ideal regulatory role of these two institutions­
agencies versus courts-is a familiar dilemma. But it cannot 
be adequately resolved without an account of how insurance 
arrangements support (either replace or complement) the regu­
latory function of tort and agency law. 
The choice of a liability standard affects the type of insurance 
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equipped, and liability insurers are relatively well equipped, to 
regulate consumer product risks. There is little that first-party 
insurers can do to regulate consumer product-injury risks. 
Health, disability, and life insurers who would pay for harms 
caused to consumers by dangerous products under a no-liability 
regime do not ordinarily distinguish between, and charge differ­
ent premiums to, consumers who purchase relatively safe prod­
ucts and those who purchase relatively dangerous products. They 
do not monitor which products their policyholders purchase, 
how safely they use those products (care-level concerns), or how 
often they use those products (activity-level concerns). Nor do 
first-party insurers deny claims on the grounds that the insured 
was contributorily negligent or assumed the risk. (One exception 
is life insurance monitoring of cigarette smoking.) In fact, first­
party insurance is often sold on a group basis, which means that 
insurers do not gather detailed information about any individual 
risk characteristic of their insureds, including those related to 
product use. And even in policies that are individually under­
written, it is usually too costly for insurers to gather and update 
product-use information. The result of this dearth of first-party 
regulatory intervention is moral hazard with respect to consumer 
care and activity levels. 
Can product liability insurers do better than first-party insur­
ers at regulating product injury risk? Product liability insurance 
is underwritten on a company-specific basis rather than a group 
basis. Product liability insurers have much at stake in the actuar­
ial experience of each of their insured manufacturers, and so they 
collect detailed information about how the product is designed, 
inspected, and manufactured; what types of quality controls and 
manufacturing standards the insureds have in place; whether 
parts used in the production process contain dangerous inputs 
and whether those parts are warranted by suppliers; and much 
more. Product liability insurers also collect information about 
the insured manufacturers' activity levels (i.e., sales volume) with 
respect to particular product lines and about past marketing inci­
dents. Liability insurers are clearly more effective than first-party 
insurers at monitoring and regulating the safety of consumer 
products, hence the case for strict product liability as a form of 
product safety regulation-in contrast to a rule of no liability or 
even fault-based liability-is strengthened. 
Workers' compensation insurance I Workplace safety is 
another area of regulation through insurance in which insur­
ers play a major role in implementing and monitoring safety. 
Workers' compensation regimes, which have been adopted in 
all SO states, constitute a form of no-fault strict liability. States 
require employers to purchase insurance either from a private 
insurer or from a state-run workers' compensation fund. Work­
ers who are injured on the job recover from their employer's 
workers' compensation insurer. In managing claims, insurers 
collect information concerning the circumstances that gave 
rise to the injury and examine the medical records document­
ing the injury. As already mentioned, workers' compensation 
insurance is one of the areas in which insurers experience-rate 
premiums and have done so for many years, and the process 
is facilitated by various industry organizations that aid in the 
collection and analysis of data. 
Workers' compensation regimes reduce worker-injury rates 
more effectively than fault-based tort regimes and direct govern­
ment regulation of workplace safety. Indeed, there is some direct 
evidence that experience-rating by workers' compensation insur­
ers has improved workplace safety, especially among larger firms 
where most individual workers are employed. 
Auto insurance I The regulation of automobile driver safety is 
divided between first-party and liability insurers. Some, but not 
all, losses are shifted from victims and their first-party insurers 
to drivers and their liability insurers. States vary with respect to 
the amount of loss shifting they do through their tort systems. 
Most states have a tort-based auto insurance regime in which 
victims can recover from negligent drivers and their liability 
insurers, or otherwise turn to their own first-party insurers. In 
those states, both first-party and liability auto insurers have an 
incentive to regulate the care levels of their insureds. In contrast, 
a minority of states have some type of no-fault regime (a mis­
nomer, which really means no-liability) in which tort recovery is 
limited and injured parties (other than pedestrians, whose tort 
claims are not limited) must rely primarily on their first-party 
auto insurers. In these states, therefore, first-party auto insurers 
are the primary regulators of driver care levels. 
The shift to no-fault in some jurisdictions may on balance 
hinder the regulatory role of insurance. On the one hand, the 
absence of tort liability, and thus of liability insurers, does not 
eliminate the incentives of drivers to avoid accidents that harm 
others. There is, after all, a large overlap between the risks that 
lead to harm to others and the risks that lead to injury to oneself 
Bad or excessive driving gives rise to an increased risk of both 
harms. Thus, when a first-party insurer takes steps to regulate 
driver conduct so as to reduce self-harm (for example, by experi­
ence rating and adjusting premiums), the risk to third-party 
victims is also reduced. 
On the other hand, first-party auto insurers do not have an 
incentive to regulate driver decisions optimally. While it is true 
that the safety they regulate affects both the insured drivers and 
their victims, the insurers fail to take account of harm to oth­
ers. Thus, in theory, auto first-party insurers would not have an 
incentive to require precautions that could be justified only by 
the total harm reduction to all potential injured parties. Those 
insurers do not make premium adjustments to account for the 
increase or decrease in risk to third-parties attributable to their 
insured driver's behavior. 
By contrast, under a fault-based tort regime in which drivers 
also purchase liability insurance, a more complete internalization 
of auto accident risks is achieved. As a result, under a fault-based 
regime, some unsafe drivers would be priced out of driving-a 
form of continually adjusting Pigouvian taxation through the 
liability insurance premium-which would not occur under a 
no-fault regime. 
In addition, under a fault-based system, drivers' choices 
among types of cars are likely to be more efficient. First-party 
insurance creates incentives to purchase large and heavy vehicles, 
such as outsized sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) or trucks, in which 
drivers are protected and their injuries are smaller. Liability 
insurance offsets these distorted incentives. Heavy vehicles cause 
greater harm to others, and these costs in fault-based states are 
borne by liability insurers, who then price those risks accordingly. 
The result, in theory, should be not only a reduction in overall 
auto accident risks, but also an improvement in the market sig­
nals sent to product manufacturers regarding the relative total 
costs (including accident costs) of small versus large vehicles. 
Auto insurance is also an area where insurance companies­
liability and first-party insurers-work cooperatively to gather 
information that enhances the market for safety. For example, the 
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), a nonprofit orga­
nization that is wholly funded by the auto insurance industry 
and whose stated goal is to reduce the losses from crashes on the 
nation's highways, has become famous for testing and rating the 
crashworthiness of new automobiles that come on the market, 
and it does so long before-and arguable better than-the govern­
ment's NHTSA ratings. These ratings help consumers choose 
safer cars and induce manufacturers to improve the designs. 
Homeowners' insurance I Residential property risk is another 
area in which insurers regulate insured behavior. Most home­
owners cannot ascertain the quality of the structure they are 
purchasing or the risks associated with inferior construction, 
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especially under conditions of high winds, fire, or earthquake. 
And yet, except to the extent the CPSC regulates household 
products, household risk is largely unregulated by the federal 
government. Rather, building safety standards are left to state 
and local governments, which typically adopt some version 
of the model building codes written by private organizations. 
Political pressures by the construction industry and short-term 
financial interests of homeowners operate to inhibit optimal 
standards and rigorous enforcement. 
Insurance helps to remedy this regulatory inefficiency. First, 
homeowners' insurers engage in direct ex ante regulation through 
the use of premium discounts for homes equipped with safety 
measures, such as smoke detectors and sprinkler systems, that 
have been found to dramatically reduce the risk of fire-related 
deaths and property damage. Similarly, insurers in Florida and 
other parts of the country subject to windstorms offer substantial 
premium discounts to homeowners who make special invest­
ments in wind mitigation, such as installing hurricane clips to 
secure the roof, anchoring the base of the home to the founda­
tion, and using special storm shutters on the windows. 
Homeowners' insurers also do something that government 
regulators do not: generate large amounts of risk-related infor­
mation through large-scale hazard simulations. The industry is 
funding a massive research facility for simulating hurricanes and 
other perils and studying how different construction techniques 
withstand wind, fire, water, and hailstorm damage. Research 
conducted at this facility is intended to do for home construc­
tion standards what the crash testing conducted by the IIHS has 
done for crashworthiness in automobiles, thereby reducing the 
losses from natural hazards. Not only will this enable the indus­
try to improve its rating of building codes, it will also refine the 
premium discounts for various safety investments. 
In each of these areas-product liability insurance, workers' 
compensation insurance, automobile insurance, and homeown­
ers' insurance-insurers already serve as quasi-private regulators 
of risk. Because of their superior access to information and their 
commercial sophistication, and because of the competitive pres­
sure to find new ways to lower their costs and hence their prices, 
insurance companies employ a variety of strategies to improve the 
safety conduct of their policyholders. In many of these examples, 
the presence of insurance reduces, rather than creates, a moral 
hazard problem. 
Insurance Versus Government Regulation 
For many, risk insurers generally work alongside the govern­
ment to regulate safety. In those areas, we identify how the 
regulatory work is divided between the insurers and govern­
ment regulators and document the added value of insurance­
incremental improvements in safety that go beyond what the 
government requires or encourages. 
Mandates versus menus I Government regulation of safety 
often takes the form of mandatory safety standards. Cars must 
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have passive restraints, factories must abide by environmental 
standards, drug companies must demonstrate the safety and 
efficacy of a drug, and commercial buildings must have fire 
sprinkler systems. Unless the regulatory safety threshold is met, 
the actor cannot engage in the regulated conduct. Regulated 
parties have no choice concerning how much of the safety mea­
sure to apply, whether it is worth the cost, or if other methods 
work better for them. 
Insurers, on the other hand, often regulate the same conduct 
while offering a menu of safety choices and corresponding prices. 
Drivers who fail to wear seatbelts have their first-party insurance 
premiums adjusted through experience rating. Factories that 
maintain higher environmental standards than the government­
mandated level have their liability insurance premiums reduced. 
Manufacturers that follow guidelines for producing safer prod­
ucts pay lower product liability insurance premiums. And homes 
that present higher fire hazards pay significantly higher property 
insurance. Largely through ex ante premium adjustments, by 
offering policyholders clear pecuniary tradeoffs, insurers induce 
actors to self-select safety. Unlike government regulation, which 
institutes uniform safety levels, insurers' regulation results in a 
spectrum of decentralized choices whereby people choose greater 
precautions when their costs are lower or when the risks they 
reduce are greater. 
Pigouvian taxes I In the presence of government-imposed strict 
liability, insurance converts the ex-post liability cost into an 
ex ante fee, the insurance premium. This fee resembles a pure 
Pigouvian tax, paid upfront and roughly equal to the externality. 
Risk-differentiated premiums cause parties to pay the expected 
external cost of their activity when choosing its scope. Insurers 
thus play an important role in shaping levels of activity. By con­
verting the uncertain expected cost of liability into a certain cost 
of the insurance premium, premiums enable insureds to make 
more-informed choices regarding activity levels. 
To be sure, government agencies can also engage in informa­
tion gathering. But unlike with insurers, the information prac­
tices of government agencies do not have to be accurate for the 
agencies to perform their primary tasks because the agencies are 
not themselves insuring the externality. Thus, they do not have to 
bear the costs of the harm from imperfect tailoring. By contrast, 
insurers who set inaccurate premiums (inaccurate Pigouvian 
taxes, as it were) would suffer a loss of profit and, at the limit, 
would be out of business. 
Converting standards into rules I Insurance arrangements 
transform the standards enacted through government regula­
tion into bright-line rules, thereby providing regulated parties 
(insureds) with concrete instruction regarding the choice of 
appropriate care levels. Negligence regimes in tort law, for 
example, set general "due care" standards; however, the deter­
mination of which particular safety measures are required by 
such standards is often left unclear to the regulated parties 
until a court resolves that question in particular cases ex post. 
Under such negligence regimes, liability insurers are often the 
agents that translate the vague legal standards into a set of 
concrete, sometimes-very-specific rules. A similar mechanism 
also operates under strict liability regimes, which do not man­
date particular safety standards, but leave the regulated parties 
to determine the privately desirable risk-reduction measures. 
Under those regimes as well, it is often the liability insurer who 
instructs the regulated party regarding specific safety choices. 
A prominent example of this collaboration between the stan­
dard-setting public regulators and standard-deciphering insurers 
is traffic safety. Tort law and highway safety regulations establish a 
framework for determining reasonable care and accident liability. 
But it is the insurance process that often establishes which actor 
is responsible for the accident, based on "mechanical and super­
ficial formulas." Because insurers have to follow routines, because 
they have to constrain the discretion that low-level adjusters 
Disseminating information I Like the insurance industry, gov­
ernment agencies gather and use information as a basic tool 
in regulating safety. For example, NHTSA collects accident 
reports from traffic law enforcers around the country, as do 
insurers. The FDA collects information about drugs; the CPSC 
collects information about risky products; the Environmental 
Protection Agency collects information about the release of 
hazardous substances; and municipalities collect information 
about restaurants' hygiene. 
Like insurers, the government disseminates this informa­
tion about risk to help people make informed decisions. Thus, 
NHTSA publishes SUV rollover ratings as well as many other 
auto safety facts. But safety ratings were prominently available 
long before NHTSA began publishing SUV rollover ratings. For 
over 50 years, the auto insurance industry has published well­
known car safety ratings that are often more stringent and cover 
more safety factors than NHT­
For over 50 years, the auto insurance industry has 
published well-known car safety ratings that are 
often more stringent and cover more safety factors 
than N HTSA's. 
SA' s. For example, the insur­
ance industry's four-grade scale 
includes many safety attributes 
that go beyond rollover risk. It 
takes into account a car's roof 
strength and how much pro-
exercise, and because basic principles of fault and negligence are 
difficult to apply, insurers turn to "mechanical presumptions" 
such as presumed liability for the negligent drivers in rear-end 
collisions or for drivers turning left in front of oncoming traffic. 
The pressure to run an efficient claims bureaucracy and to "close 
cases" generates greater reliance on simple rules than the back­
ground legal system provides. 
Stricter codes of safety I Another function that insurers per­
form is the design of safety mandates that exceed the gov­
ernment-regulated "floor." Take building codes, for example. 
Although municipalities vary in the level of safety investments 
that they require in residential and commercial buildings, they 
are often quite lenient. While it is true that electrical wiring is 
inspected for safety and commercial buildings must meet fire 
safety and emergency standards, many of the safety-related ele­
ments of the design and construction process are left unregu­
lated. Property insurers step in and incentivize-and sometimes 
even require-adherence to stricter safety standards. Similarly, 
environmental regulations set various standards relating to 
environmental exposures and harms. Environmental liabil­
ity insurers complement this regulatory floor by requiring 
their insureds to comply with stricter codes written by private 
groups. They go beyond minimal compliance checks by pro­
moting, through discounts and mandates, participation in 
private Environmental Management Systems that follow strict 
codes of environmental compliance. 
tection it provides in the event 
of a rollover. Experts can debate 
whether the insurance ratings 
capture a more or less impor-
tant set of factors than the government's ratings, but it is likely 
that the more robust the ratings that insurers produce, the less 
necessary is the government's scheme. Given the comprehensive 
data insurers have and their incentive to rate cars credibly, this 
particular safety-related exercise can probably be largely out­
sourced to the insurance industry. 
Expanding the Role oflnsurance 
Can private insurance markets supplement or even replace 
regulation in some settings? Below are some suggestions for 
doing so. 
Consumer contracts I Consumers require protection because 
they sometimes agree to bad terms in their contracts, not 
understanding in advance what they have agreed to. Consum­
ers also require protection because the promises that are made 
to them are sometimes broken: for example, products are not 
as described, merchandise is not delivered, money is excessively 
charged. When these breaches occur, contract law provides 
remedies, but enforcement is costly and largely impractical. 
Individual consumers cannot credibly threaten to sue; as a 
result, businesses are undeterred. 
dass actions are one way to deal with this under-enforcement 
problem, but impediments to such actions abound. Some claims 
are not aggregable into representative classes; some contracts waive 
class-action rights; and attorney-fee arrangements sometimes 
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produce an imperfect selection of cases. The universe of contract 
claims that are too small or too complex to pursue individually 
in litigation is vast. Often obscured by lengthy standard forms, 
consumers cannot distinguish their rights, cannot adequately seek 
redress, and have to rely on nonlegal mechanisms (e.g., sellers' rat­
ings, retailer return policies) to steer clear of the risk of loss. 
Do first-party insurance arrangements relieve some of the 
insecurity that consumers, deprived of de facto contractual 
remedies, experience in these contexts? And could such insur­
ance actually provide businesses with incentives to perform their 
promises? 
Pockets of explicit first-party consumer-protection insur­
ance already exist, and it is not difficult to see why. Consider, for 
example, individuals who purchase cars on eBay Motors. In that 
market, consumers send money to sellers who often do not have 
a brick-and-mortar location, have undeveloped reputations and 
limited assets, and who, for all of these reasons, might easily take 
or otherwise wrongful behavior and, in effect, ''blacklist" them. 
Sellers that are repeat offenders could be singled out by insurers 
and classified as bad risks. Insurers could, in turn, warn insured 
consumers not to purchase from these high-risk sellers and could 
in extreme cases exclude coverage for claims arising out of sales 
involving the worst-offending sellers. Exclusions that say such 
things as, "This policy does not cover purchases from Seller X," 
would serve the ex ante regulatory role of increasing the salience 
of those companies' nonperformance risk, deterring misconduct. 
Market-making insurers can even charge businesses for cover­
age. For example, eBay Motors provides an insurance-like buyer 
protection program without charging buyers any premium. 
Instead, it charges sellers for the cost of the program, and it can 
differentiate the price according to the seller's record and expel 
sellers who breach their obligations. 
Why is such an insurance product not already offered broadly? 
We noted that miscellaneous first-parry consumer insurance 
pockets exist through the 
The market-makers, retailers, and payment 
intermediaries sometimes step in and offer bonds, 
guarantee programs, or recovery funds to induce 
buyers to enter their network. 
efforts of market makers, pay­
ment systems, and warranty 
programs-all in areas in which 
the liability system is ineffec­
tive in shifting the costs to the 
wrongdoers. But the full-blown 
information tools of the insur-
the money and run. Yes, buyers have legal remedies when eBay 
sellers breach their agreements, but the enforcement of such 
remedies is unlikely. 
Perhaps in response to this legal-remedial void, eBay Motors 
itself provides a number of options for insuring car buyers against 
the risk of non- or underperformance by car sellers. For example, 
eBay Motors provides disappointed buyers a fund from which 
they can recover the lost payment if the seller defrauds them, up 
to $50,000. Similarly, online purchasers of consumer electronics 
can use a service like SquareTrade to buy what amounts to first­
party insurance against the types of risks that contractual seller­
provided warranties would usually cover. Credit card issuers often 
provide similar "purchase protection" to buyers of consumer 
products who use the issuer's credit card as the form of payment. 
PayPal likewise offers a "Buyer Protection Plan" that reimburses 
buyers for the full price and shipping costs if their complaint 
against the seller is found to be meritorious. In all of these cases 
where there is a risk of the seller taking the money and running, 
the market makers, retailers, and payment intermediaries some­
rimes step in to offer bonds (or guarantee programs or recovery 
funds) to induce buyers to enter their network. 
Perhaps less obvious, this new type of first-party consumer 
transaction insurance could also deter opportunism on the part 
of businesses that sell to consumers. For example, through vari­
ous information aggregation techniques, insurers might be able 
to identify sellers who engage systematically in opportunistic 
44 I REGULATION I Spring 2013 
ance industry have not been 
harnessed to this end, perhaps 
because the demand for such 
coverage is already filled by the niche assurance products. What 
seems more likely, however, is that, until recently, it was assumed 
by insurers that the demand for coverage against the risks of 
consumer product under- or nonperformance was met by the 
product sellers themselves through the sale of product warranties. 
It is also possible that the trend in American law of businesses 
using mandatory arbitration clauses to immunize themselves 
against court-imposed liability for breach of consumer product 
contracts may dramatically increase the demand for first-party 
insurance coverage as a substitute for legal control of consumer 
product quality. 
Conclusion 
Insurers regulate risk in various ways. From mandating spe­
cific investments in risk reduction, to offering premium dis­
counts for favorable claims experience, to selling cost-con­
tainment expertise to policyholders, and even to the design 
of safety technologies and codes, insurers perform many of 
the same regulatory functions that government regulators 
and courts perform. However, in many (though obviously 
not all) situations, private insurers, because of their inherent 
informational comparative advantage, should be expected 
to do the job of regulation better than public regulators and 
courts. Through private contracting, insurers monitor safety 
in ways that legal commands cannot. m 
